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Environmental compensations and the problem of 
“constitutive incommensurability”: a sociological 
analysis. 
Laura Centemeri1 
1LAMES (CNRS/AMU) 
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to discuss environmental compensations from the 
perspective of the pragmatic sociology of valuation.  I use valuation to point to the 
social process of attribution of value, in this case the attribution of value to an 
environment. Value should not be intended exclusively as economic value but as any 
form of attribution of worth and importance to the environment. If an environment is 
valued, this means that it matters to us. And the ways in which an environment can 
matter to us are radically plural. The existence in our societies of a plurality of modes 
of valuation of the environment can account for different kinds of problems of 
incommensurability we are confronted to when deciding on the compensability of an 
environmental loss. In particular, when the environment is valued as a place of 
personal attachments –on the basis of a “familiar engagement” with the environment- 
this gives rise to a form of radical (or “constitutive”) incommensurability, which 
implies the refusal to consider a certain environment as equivalent to others. Through 
the case-study of the opposition to the expansion of the Malpensa airport in Milan, I 
will show how, when contesting the legitimacy of compensations, social actors can 
rely on “environmental goods of proximity” to challenge the legitimacy of the 
equivalences implied by compensation measures and, more generally, to challenge the 
higher general interest justifying the sacrifice of environmental goods. 
1 Introduction 
The term environmental or ecological compensations (or offsets) 
points to environmental measures that are meant to counterbalance the 
negative impacts on an environment caused by plans or projects meant 
to support economic development. The aim of the paper is to discuss 
environmental compensations from the perspective of the pragmatic 
sociology of valuation.1 I use valuation to point to the social process of 
                                                     
1
 For a general presentation and discussion of pragmatic sociology see 
Bénatouïl (1999), Dodier (1993), Silber (2003), Wagner (1999) and the 
special issue of the European Journal of Social Theory edited by Blokker 
(2011). For a review of North American and European research on sociology 
of valuation and evaluation, to which French pragmatic sociology has given 
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attribution of value, in this case the attribution of value to an 
environment. Value should not be intended exclusively as economic 
value but as any form of attribution of worth and importance to the 
environment. If an environment is valued, this means that it matters to 
us. And the ways in which an environment can matter to us are 
radically plural. 
I argue that the study of how we value the environment – or 
conversely, how the environment matters to us – is crucial to provide us 
with a more complete understanding of the actual possibility to 
compensate for the loss of nature. This possibility of compensation 
should not be exclusively investigated as a scientific problem, that is, as 
a problem related to purely ecological dimensions. Other values, than 
the ecological one, have to be taken into account as well, if we want to 
understand what accounts for the social acceptability of environmental 
compensations as an appropriate way to deal with the negative 
environmental impacts provoked by plans and projects meant to 
support economic development.   
From the vantage point of pragmatic sociology, it is possible better to 
understand conflicts concerning the acceptability of compensations as 
conflicts that originate from the pluralism of modes (or registers) of 
valuation of the environment existing in our societies (Lafaye and 
Thévenot, 1993; Lafaye, Moody and Thévenot, 2000).  
Environmental compensations are thus revealed as complex social 
objects once they are intended as measures aiming at replacing lost 
environmental values or as measures meant to support the acceptability 
of a local environmental “sacrifice” in the name of a higher general 
interest. What are the relevant values lost because of the environmental 
impacts and to what extent they can be replaced; what makes the 
sacrifice of environmental values acceptable: these are not merely 
technical or scientific issues but social and political problems. 
Environmental compensations are the case for conflicts of 
environmental valuation: that is why I propose in this paper a frame to 
sociologically understand these conflicts. .  
Environmental compensations imply to establish an equivalence 
between the environmental values which are lost and the environmental 
values which are created and that are meant as compensation. This 
implies that environmental compensations rely on some notion of 
                                                                                                                              
an important contribution, see Lamont (2012). 
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commensurability and commensurability is a social and political 
process (Desrosières, 1990; 1992; Espeland and Stevens, 1998). To 
establish an equivalence means to consider as expression of the same 
value things which are not the same: in this sense, commensuration is a 
political act since it makes us look at different things as being the same, 
thus changing our way to frame and make sense of the world around us 
(Desrosières, 1998). 
Refusing environmental compensations as unacceptable often 
implies to claim for the incommensurability of the negatively impacted 
environment. As I am going to discuss, the existence in our societies of 
a plurality of modes of valuation of the environment can account for 
different kinds of problems of incommensurability we are confronted to 
when deciding on the compensability of an environmental loss. In 
particular, when the environment is valued as a place of personal 
attachments –on the basis of a “familiar engagement” with the 
environment- this gives rise to a form of radical (or “constitutive”) 
incommensurability, which implies the refusal to consider a certain 
environment as equivalent to others. “Constitutive incommensurability” 
(Raz, 1986) implies a mode of engagement with the environment, 
based on familiarity, which constitutes this environment as a spatial-
temporal unique (O‟Neill et al., 2008: 74): this process brings to the 
creation of what I will call environmental goods of proximity. Through 
the case-study of the opposition to the expansion of the Malpensa 
airport in Milan, I will show how, when contesting the legitimacy of 
compensations, social actors can rely on these environmental goods of 
proximity to challenge the legitimacy of the equivalences implied by 
compensation measures and, more generally, to challenge the higher 
general interest justifying the sacrifice of environmental goods. 
2 Understanding commensurability (and incommensurability) in 
environmental valuation as a social process 
Incommensurability is a key-concept of the critique addressed by 
ecological economics to the neoclassical economic understanding of 
problems of environmental valuation.2 In standard environmental 
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 See Spash (1999), Martinez-Alier (2002) and Gowdy and Erickson (2005) 
for a detailed discussion of ecological economics as a “heterodox” approach 
opposed to the mainstream neoclassical perspective of environmental 
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economics, “environmental valuation” is a matter of putting a (market) 
price on the environment. The virtue of pricing environmental goods 
and functions is to allow commensuration between alternative options 
or courses of action. According to the utilitarian approach, which 
provides the theoretical basis of this mainstream economic approach, 
commensuration is a prerequisite for rational decisions.  
In contrast, many of the economists joining ecological economics 
reframe environmental valuation as an “open social process” to which 
problems of value incommensurability are unavoidable. Value 
incommensurability – i.e. the existence of plural ways to value the 
environment not reducible to a single common standard of valuation - 
is presented as “a foundation stone for ecological economics” 
(Martinez-Alier, O‟Neill and Munda, 1998). 
In reframing environmental valuation as a social process, ecological 
economists rely upon the philosophical critique of the generalised 
commensurability implied by utilitarianism. According to this critique, 
incommensurability is unavoidable since the goods a human being 
pursues in life so as to flourish are radically plural.3 More specifically, 
vis-à-vis the generalised possibility of trade-off assumed in the 
utilitarian tradition, the concept of “constitutive incommensurabilities” 
(Raz, 1986: 345-353) has been coined to point to certain social 
relations and evaluative commitments whose existence implies a 
refusal to trade them off: love and friendship are usually invoked as 
examples of such social relations, as well as certain modes of 
attachment to the environment (O‟Neill et al., 2008: 79; Espeland, 
1994). 
The idea that valuation is a “social process” to which 
incommensurability is key since environmental values are plural has 
become very popular in ecological economics literature. However, we 
can detect some sociological blind spots in the way in which 
                                                                                                                              
economics. On the limits of the market approach to environmental issues see 
in particular O‟Neill (2007).  
3
 The philosophical debate on value incommensurability was particularly 
lively at the end of the 1990‟s. See in particular the contributions in the book 
edited by Chang (1997) and in the special issue of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review edited by Adler (1998). As remarked by 
D‟Agostino (2003), the philosophical debate has largely ignored the important 
sociological discussions on commensuration as a social phenomenon.  
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environmental valuation is addressed as a social process in this debate.4 
First of all, “values” are used as a sort of “black box” to point to 
alternative, non-economic, definitions of the valuable (meaning not 
based on prices) without explaining why some of these definitions 
appear as more legitimate than others in the space of deliberation. 
Moreover, it is not clear in what terms “constitutive 
incommensurability” represents a specific challenge to deliberation.  
In order to understand conflicts between different languages and 
practices of valuation of the environment is thus necessary first of all to 
define in what terms economic valuation is related to others non 
economic forms of valuation. Second it is necessary to explore the 
specific “grammar” of valuation on which public deliberation relies in 
our modern societies. However, in order to answer these questions, we 
need first of all to specify in what terms conflicting languages and 
practices of valuation differ. 
3 Explaining languages and practices of valuation through regimes 
of engagement 
In a similar move to the one promoted by Dewey‟s pragmatism 
(Bidet, Quéré and Truc, 2011; Vatin, 2013), the variety of modes of 
valuation is considered in pragmatic sociology as related to the very 
same dynamic explaining the variety observable in human action. 
Valuation is in fact understood as the result of an evaluative judgment 
through which agents frame a given situation in order to carry out “the 
appropriate action” (Thévenot, 1990; Boltanski and Thévenot: 2006: 
349). This judgement orients their ways to establish a relationship (that 
is, to engage and to coordinate) with the surrounding environment and 
results in attributions of value to human and non human beings. Action 
is thus understood in pragmatic sociology as engagement and 
coordination with the environment: coordination is possible if actors 
share the same evaluative judgment on the situation, which implies to 
share the same mode of engaging with human and non human beings 
involved in the situation and to value them.  
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 Sociologists have largely ignored this debate, which is situated at the frontier 
between economic sociology and environmental sociology. Moreover the 
renewed interest of economic sociologists for valuation is quite recent, the 
same being true for environmental issues.  
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The judgement of “appropriateness” of the action to a given situation 
is considered as crucial to the understanding of human action and it 
implies an evaluative moment in its unfolding. This evaluation is based 
on the good that the agent can aim at through coordination with the 
social and material environment. Three types of good are referred to in 
pragmatic sociology as generally recognised to guide human action: the 
“ease” of the accommodation with a familiar and appropriated 
environment; the good of the fulfilment of a planned action; the 
“common good” beneficial to the polity as a whole (Thévenot, 1990; 
2001; 2006; 2007).5 
On this basis, three main registers or modes of action  - called 
“regimes of engagement” - are identified: the familiar regime, the 
regime in a plan (or normal regime of action) and the public 
justification regime (Boltanksi and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2007).6  
The public justification regime of action has been the most 
extensively explored and discussed. It defines a mode of action and 
valuation which is required by an agent in order to assure the largest 
possible coordination - a “public” coordination - open potentially to 
every human being. In fact, according to Boltanski and Thévenot the 
“justifiable action” and its specific mode of valuation are the 
cornerstone of the modern construction of the “public sphere” as a 
distinct sphere of social life. The construction of the public sphere goes 
with the definition of a specific mode of engagement and valuation of 
the surrounding human and material environment which is required to 
agents. In the way the public sphere has been historically built, the 
engagement required to agents is based on the qualification of human 
and non human beings according to their being worthy in terms of a 
                                                     
5
 By “common good” Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) refer to a political and 
historical construction, that of a principle of evaluation endowed with 
universality and intended to organise the polity as an ordered equilibrium 
oriented toward justice. 
6
 “Regimes of engagement” are descriptive models of action. They are not the 
reconstruction of social reality and of its objective structures, nor are they 
predictive models of phenomena or behaviours. These models look to clearly 
define the competences and resources to which each actor should have 
recourse in order to produce a certain type of coordination with the social and 
material environment within a given context. Each model of action thus has 
its own corresponding “grammar”: this is the sense in which one can speak of 
“regimes” (Boltanski, 1990; Thévenot, 1990). 
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legitimate definition of the common good. Consequently, legitimate 
attributions of value are those establishing an order (of people and 
things in the situation) that is fair and just, since it respects their worth 
evaluated from the standpoint of the common good.  
The fairness and justice of these attributions of value are proved 
through appropriate “tests of reality”. In the course of action, agents 
test the appropriateness of their evaluation having recourse to specific 
objects and instruments expressly conceived or formatted to assess 
value, or to more or less formalized valuation practices involving the 
material surroundings. In the public regime of action, tests of reality are 
performed through instruments and equipments that objectively assess 
the worth through the establishment of a “space of equivalence” based 
on the common good as the evaluative standpoint (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 133-138). Consequently, commensuration is the 
operation which is at the heart of the reality tests meant to assess the 
legitimacy of a public attribution of worth. 
The authors point out a specific feature of our modern society which 
accounts for its complexity: different definitions of the worth of people 
and things are equally held as publicly legitimate. In fact, plural 
specifications of the common good have emerged historically. This 
implies that plural legitimate “orders of worth” are possible in our 
societies.7 In their research on practical modes of justification, 
Boltanski and Thévenot detect six different expressions of the common 
good in our society, defining as many justifiable social and economic 
general orders with their corresponding modes of valuation: market 
competition, industrial efficiency, fame, civic solidarity, domestic trust, 
inspiration.8 The results is that in our societies plural legitimate logics 
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 The increasing importance of modes of valuation implying quantification in 
order to commensurate has been explored in sociology, since the beginnings 
of the discipline, as a social process crucial to the construction of capitalism. 
A relevant contribution that sociology brings to the mostly philosophical 
debate on commensuration is precisely to stress the importance of the 
historical and practical dimension of commensuration “as a social process” 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998). In order to commensurate, we actively 
intervene in the world around us so as to make the cognitive exercise of 
equivalence easier: we format the environment around us, we build 
instruments or we define indicators and procedures to assure commensuration. 
8
 Orders of worth are thus based on conceptual constructions of the common 
good that have historically emerged (Thévenot, 2011). That is why orders of 
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of commensuration are possible to establish an order according to the 
value (or worth) of the beings involved in the situation.9  
Compared to the justifiable action, the “normal action” and the 
“familiar engagement” point to modes of coordination and valuation 
whose extension and public legitimacy are more limited. They are 
restricted respectively to those having a stake (an interest) in the action 
and to those being familiar with the environment. Consequently, 
moving from the normal action to the familiarity regime, the reality 
tests through which agents check on the appropriateness of their 
evaluation of the situation are progressively less dependent on a general 
standard assessing functions and needs and more embedded in a 
knowledge produced and shared through a personalised practice.  
Reading action through this plurality of modes of engagement, 
pragmatic sociology brings us to consider the human agent as plural in 
her ways to be an “agent-in-the-environment”. The same person is 
capable of different kinds of agency - understood as diverse kinds of 
capacity to act – which are sustained by different ways of engaging 
with the environment and to value it: the personality with attachments 
in the familiar engagement, the individual with autonomy and interests 
in the normal action, the person acting for the common good in the 
justification regime. Accordingly, the surrounding environment is 
cognitively framed by agents as familiar environment, functional 
objects, or conventional entities. This means that according to the mode 
of engagement with the environment, the relevant information for 
testing the appropriateness of action is not the same: perceptual clues in 
                                                                                                                              
worth are not limited to six and new orders can always emerge, as shown by 
the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) on the network-based worth of 
contemporary capitalism and by the emerging “green” order of worth 
discussed by Lafaye and Thévenot (1993). It is important to notice that these 
orders of worth do not overlap precisely with “spheres” of social activity. This 
is the main difference between this approach and Michael Walzer‟s theory of 
spheres of justice As I am going to argue, social situations are always marked 
by the simultaneous presence of multiple logics of order that could potentially 
be applied.  
9
 Commensurating is thus not necessarily monetising. Money is historically 
the most relevant tool assuring commensuration in our societies but we can 
commensurate without necessarily using money and yet the logics of 
commensurate through money are plural. 
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the familiar regime, ordinary language of functions and needs in the 
normal action, codified language in the public action.  
Each regime points to a “practical grammar” of valuation: valuation 
is based on legitimate conventions related to orders of worth in the 
justification regime; on utility in the regime of the normal action; on 
personal attachments in the familiar regime. The possibility to share 
these languages and practices of valuation with others, thus assuring 
coordination and agreement, is unequal. When an evaluation is based 
on the reference to a legitimate order of worth, the possibility of 
agreement or disagreement on the valuable is open to a “generalised 
other” (Mead) since the value can be objectively tested through 
appropriate instruments and tools collectively devised at this purpose 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). The conventions that qualify and 
frame the involved entities according to general categories of worth 
allow for an objective test of the value without requiring a direct, in-
depth, knowledge of the situation. In contrast, agreement or 
disagreement require a shared and direct experience of familiarisation 
when an evaluation is based on the familiar engagement. Nevertheless, 
far from being limited to the sphere of “the private”, valuations resting 
on ease assured by personal arrangements can be shared with others, 
since they are understandable to others, they can be communicated and 
they can sustain critical claims. 
However, critique based on valuations resting on familiarity cannot 
be easily expressed in the public space. The latter is historically and 
culturally built on the principle that legitimate forms of valuation 
require a “detached” perspective on what the relevant features 
accounting for the worth or the utility of something or someone are: 
they require objectivity (Porter, 1995). Forms of valuing based on 
personal attachments can be understood by others and shared with 
them, but they are not acceptable as legitimate arguments in the public 
debate. They have to find a way to be articulated with legitimate 
definitions of the worth. This is a structural reason accounting for the 
unequal power of languages of valuation we can observe in public 
deliberation. Similarly, the increasing importance attributed in our 
societies to quantifiable expressions of the worth together with the 
privilege accorded to modes of coordination based on the negotiation of 
individual interests has progressively reduced the place for modes of 
valuation which rely on more qualitative appreciation of the worth. 
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4 The value of the environment in the public space: “order 
incommensurability” and “radical incommensurability” 
If we conceive action as engagement and coordination with the 
environment there is an inner tension, thus revealed, in the very same 
word of “environment” and its uses in our societies, with major 
consequences for the understanding of environmental valuation 
conflicts. In fact, what we call the “Environment” (meaning “Nature”) 
is revealed as a specific way to qualify the environs or surroundings of 
some person, being or community and to engage with it, in terms of 
public or normal action. In these two modes of action a (human) subject 
is separated from and confronted to a (non human) object whereas in 
the familiar engagement the frontier between subject and object is 
blurred. 
In the public sphere, the environment matters as nature. The public 
legitimate modes of valuing nature are plural and they are unevenly 
relying on quantified and measurable expressions of the value. Nature 
can be valued as “heritage” according to a domestic worth; or as 
expression of “wilderness”, according to an inspired worth; or as a 
“place of renown” according to a worth based on fame. These “orders 
of worth” are example of public legitimate modes of valuation not 
relying on a strictly quantified definition of value but still assuring a 
general ordering. In fact, general agreed upon modes of objectifying 
value are here at work, based on codified knowledge and expert 
judgment, that guarantee the possibility of ordering. When nature is 
valued as “economic good” according to a market worth or as a 
resource for production according to an industrial worth, quantified 
modes of valuation are introduced, in terms of prices or efficiency 
indicators. Nature can also be valued as a “public good” to which 
collective rights are associated : we can then speak about a civic mode 
of valuation of the environment. The increasing relevance of 
“biodiversity” as mode of valuation of the environment shows the 
progressive construction of a specific “green” order of worth largely 
still in the making and largely based on scientific quantification 
(Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993) . 
These plural modes of valuation all rest on a same mode of 
engagement with the environment which is the publicly justifiable 
mode of engagement: the environment is framed by agents through 
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general and agreed upon categories of qualification. The environment is 
always a “qualified” environment.   
It is thus possible to identify a first kind of problem of 
incommensurability that we are confronted with in environmental 
valuation conflicts. I propose to define it order incommensurability. By 
problem of order incommensurability I mean a critical situation in 
which there is difficulty to agree, in the public space, on the criterion of 
commensuration that is pertinent to test the legitimacy of a decision or 
action. When confronted with a problem of order incommensurability, 
disputes and controversies involve disagreement on how to 
commensurate but they do not involve whether to commensurate. The 
conflicting valuations at stake all rest on a public justification 
engagement of the agents with the environment. The conflict does not 
involve the nature of the appropriate evaluative judgment: it involves 
the common good aimed at through coordination. The modes of 
valuation that sustain a coordination oriented towards market 
competition are not the same as the ones sustaining a coordination to 
achieve industrial efficiency, or civic solidarity. However, in all these 
different cases the kind of engagement required from agents with the 
environment is the same and it requires commensuration in order to 
successfully coordinate with others. 
The question that arises is how an agreement can be reached 
notwithstanding order incommensurability. A possible way out of this 
dilemma is to have one principle that dominates over the others. But 
from the evidence collected by Boltanski and Thévenot, the most 
frequent scenario is that of conflicting valuations reconciled in a 
“composite arrangement” or “compromise”. In a compromise held in 
public – which is different from a private arrangement reached by 
mutual agreement of the actors involved or the negotiation of interests 
– the imperative of justification is not satisfied but neither is it 
completely lost from sight: “In a compromise, the participants do not 
attempt to clarify the principle of their agreement; they are favourably 
disposed toward the notion of a common good without actively seeking 
one” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 277-278). In a compromise, 
different logics of commensuration are brought together to structure 
spaces of equivalence that are not completely coherent but solid enough 
to sustain a justifiable evaluative judgment and the following 
attributions of value.10 
                                                     
10
 In the domain of the environment, an example of what Boltanski and 
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However, environmental issues confront us with a different kind of 
problem of incommensurability, when the environment is valued on the 
basis of a familiar engagement. From this perspective, the environment 
is valuable since it is a “dwelled environment”.  
I use the expression “dwelled environment” to refer to a place that a 
person values because she moves and feels “at ease” in it, and because 
memories are deposited there. The dwelled environment is the source 
of what I will call “environmental goods of proximity”. Following 
anthropologist Tim Ingold (2000), I consider as dwelled environment 
the environment we appropriate forging intimate bonds with human and 
non human beings in it and thus creating a place in which interactions 
occur effortlessly. The person is “distributed” in her dwelled 
environment which becomes a constitutive part of the person so that, if 
affected, the consequences rebound directly on her. However, from an 
external, non familiar, point of view, the dwelled environment can be 
just a “natural” environment, even a “wilderness”. 
When studying environmental valuation conflicts concerning public 
decisions impacting the environment or compensations for 
environmental losses, we constantly come up against attributions of 
value based on familiarity and the difficulty of integrating them into the 
public process of valuation to which objectivation is so central. We are 
constantly confronted with problems of radical or constitutive 
incommensurability.  
In fact, through familiar engagement people develop attachments to 
beings and objects they value since they participate in maintaining their 
milieu, in which the person is distributed (Berque, 2000; Breviglieri, 
2012). They are valuable in a way that excludes commensuration, as 
commensuration would imply considering these persons, objects and 
other entities of the environment as separate and “equivalent” to others 
according to a general qualification or a simple function.  
We can of course always commensurate them, but this would be 
meaningless from a dwelling perspective. These radically 
incommensurable beings can be equally valuable for other people but 
                                                                                                                              
Thévenot call a “public arrangement for the common good” is the reference to 
“sustainable development” (Godard, 2003). Sustainable development refers to 
a largely underspecified “common good”. That is why we can come across so 
many different definitions of sustainability. Nevertheless, arrangements for 
sustainable development can be defended in public and they justify decisions 
and agreements or enable critique. 
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not because we share a standard for judgement – which anyone, a 
generalised other, could apply – but because we share the same kind of 
engagement with these very same beings. “Clues” to understanding the 
value “from within” are at stake here, not ciphers to decode what makes 
their worth “from without” (Ingold, 2000).   
Once detected the existence of these modes of valuation of the 
environment based on familiarity, and of the environmental goods of 
proximity they constitute, how to deal with the problems of their 
inclusion in the process of public decision and deliberation? They have 
to be either translated into interests or compatibilized through 
mediation with legitimate definitions of worth (Doidy, 2003; Richard-
Ferroudji, 2011). If translation and mediations are not successful, these 
modes of valuation based on familiarity are excluded from the process 
of deliberation on what makes the value of the environment and they 
can give account of a source of critique opposing the legitimacy of 
public decision. 
5 Environmental compensations as a scientific-technical problem 
and as a conflict of valuations. 
As pointed out by Cowell (1997), the idea that environmental 
compensations could reconcile social activities having major impacts 
on the environment and the objective to maintain the environmental 
resource base, rests on an idea of environment as “natural capital”. 
Environment is thus seen as a reservoir of environmental goods and 
services. Environmental services are defined according to an 
instrumental mode of valuation  of the environment: the environment is 
valuable since it is useful in order to assure certain functions, to human 
beings and non human beings and entities (notably ecosystems). 
Environmental goods are defined as such according to conventional 
modes of valuation based on legitimate orders of worth. However, we 
have pointed out that an engagement of familiarity with the 
environment implies that a specific environment matters to a person in 
a way that gives rise to a specific kind of environmental goods: 
“environmental goods of proximity”. These environmental goods of 
proximity are not defined according to general criteria of worth but 
according to a specific kind of experience and relationship (attachment, 
ease) that links the person to a specific environment. 
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Commensurability as equivalence of functions or as equivalence of 
goods in a scale of worth is central to the idea of environmental 
compensations as a way to maintain environmental capital. 
Environmental goods of proximity, however, raise problems of radical 
incommensurability and they are usually not included in the definition 
of environmental capital. They thus configure a form of loss that 
remains more often than not invisible and unaccounted for in the public 
discussion concerning environmental damage (on this point see 
Centemeri 2011).  
Environmental compensations however are not exclusively 
challenged in their being a proper response to environmental loss by the 
existence of environmental goods of proximity. In fact, concerning the 
equivalence of functions, when ecological functions are at stake, a 
scientific-technical problem emerges as to how define the 
compensation needs, how to choose the right measures and following 
up their success from an ecological point of view. These questions are 
all object of controversial discussions at scientific and technical levels 
(Rundcrantz and Skärbäck 2003). As remarked by Cowell (1997: 296) 
“environmental organizations have been extremely careful to limit the 
circumstances in which compensatory measures could legitimize 
damage to existing environmental qualities, particularly with respect to 
biodiversity objectives. (…) many semi-natural habitats cannot be 
adequately compensated because of deficient understanding of complex 
ecological processes and the technical and managerial problems of fully 
replacing species assemblages on relevant time-scales”. 
These scientific-technical problems are coupled with problems raised 
once we question compensations in terms of compensating for the loss 
of environmental goods. The plurality of legitimate modes of valuation 
I have previously discussed helps to understand how a same 
environment could be valued as a public legitimate good according to 
different definitions of what accounts for an environmental good. I 
have pointed out that these plural definitions of the worth are unequally 
relying on quantification. Interpreting sustainability as the maintaining 
of environmental assets promotes a “calculative” approach to 
environmental loss and potential compensation which implies that 
modes of environmental valuation that are not relying on quantification 
may progressively slip from policy agendas.  
These legitimate modes of valuation not relying on strict 
quantification (for example: environment as valuable landscape and 
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environment as valuable heritage) are particularly propitious to the 
articulation with mode of valuation based on familiarity: they can offer 
a way to “mediate” between valuation based on attachments and 
general forms of valuation.  
When legitimate registers of valuation not based on quantification 
are considered in public decision as less relevant than the quantified 
ones, this implies a lexicographic ordering of modes of valuation that 
goes with little explicit attention given to attachments to the 
environment as a source of environmental goods. Moreover, valuations 
based on personal attachments can be crucial to the construction of a 
social critique and social mobilization challenging the acceptability of 
environmental compensations as a way to solve the problem of the 
negative impacts of plans and projects meant to promote economic 
development.  
In fact, the burden of ameliorating the tensions between 
commitments to protecting environmental quality (threatened by plans 
and projects) and objectives of economic development (basically the 
tensions implicit in the principle of sustainable development), falls 
more and more upon environmental compensations (especially habitat 
creation and restoration techniques). At the same time, the recognition 
of an “higher interest” justifying the projects and plans causing 
environmental degradation implies that environmental compensation 
need not be justified strictly as equivalent. The “higher interest” implies 
to accept a sacrifice of various kinds of environmental goods, 
especially “environmental goods of proximity”.  
In conflicts against plans and projects, those who oppose plans and 
projects usually challenge both the legitimacy of the “higher interest” 
and the acceptability of compensations. As remarked by Cowell (1997, 
p.298) “determining what might compensate for a particular 
environmental loss is shown to be a messy question, inextricably bound 
up with value-laden scientific and political judgments”.  
In fact, we can never judge about the acceptability of an 
environmental compensation without considering more in general the 
issues related to the legitimacy of the plans and projects that justifies 
the environmental loss. It follows that acceptable compensations are 
those that soundly compensate (in scientific, technical and social terms) 
for projects whose general interest is not a case for conflict. Through 
the case of the opposition to the Malpensa airport expansion I am going 
further to discuss this issue. 
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6 Compensations and incommensurabilities in the case of the 
expansion of the Malpensa airport. 
The Malpensa “City of Milan” airport is situated approximately 50 
Km northwest of the city of Milan (Lombardy, Italy). It has a surface 
area of 1.220ha and its impacts have influences on the territories of two 
regions, Lombardy and Piedmont. The airport site borders the Regional 
Park of the Ticino river, a protected natural area instituted by a regional 
law in 1974, and classified since 2002 as a “Man and Biosphere” 
(MAB) reserve by UNESCO. Various protected sites under the 
“Habitat” Directive are situated near the airport. The proximity to the 
Ticino Park has been since the 1970‟s a strong argument for limiting 
the expansion of the airport.  
The airport is managed by Sea (Società esercizi aeroportuali), a joint 
stock company controlled by the Municipality of Milan. The current 
phase of expansion of the Malpensa airport is the result of a long and 
complex story of contested previous expansions. The current plan of 
expansion presented by Sea includes the construction of a third runway 
(besides the two already existing ones), a new terminal, and the 
expansion of the so called “Cargo City”, an area equipped for storing 
goods and that host commercial facilities. In fact, Sea has a business 
expansion strategy based not only on airport business, but also on real 
estate investments (Beria and Scholz 2010, 72). 
An additional area of 330ha, largely a natural area (not protected), 
will be included in the airport borders if the plan is approved. The plan 
for the expansion is currently undergoing a procedure of Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) and it is raising oppositions in the 
communities that are going to be affected. Displacements of inhabitants 
are planned in the hamlet of Tornavento if the third runway is realized. 
I can not enter into the details of the complex and long story of 
conflicts related to the expansions of the Malpensa airport. I am going 
to try to introduce those elements that are relevant in order to 
understand why the legitimacy of the project is contested at the local 
level and how compensations enter the scene.  
The first plan of expansion: “The Great Malpensa” (1972-1987)  
The idea of expanding the Malpensa airport – existing since 1948 as 
a two runways international airport - has been considered since mid-
1960‟s. The first official project of expansion, called the “Great 
Malpensa” plan, approved in 1972, contemplated the creation of a third 
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runway adjacent to the area that in 1974 was established, through the 
Lombardy Regional Law n.2, as the protected area of the Ticino Park.  
The airport expansion plan, elaborated by S.e.a. and designed for a 
traffic of 6 million passengers per year, was based exclusively on air 
traffic forecasts, which confirmed the strong positive trend of air 
transportation. The expansion was thus justified by expected trends of 
air traffic development.  
The plan of expansion of the “Great Malpensa”, once communicated 
to local authorities, was confronted to harsh oppositions raised by a 
front formed by local administrations, trade unions, inhabitants, 
environmental NGOs, all federated against the expansion. The 
opponents of the expansion denounced the lack of participation and 
inclusion in the decision-making process (Feldman 1977). These 
groups denounced as well the heavy costs inflicted on the territory, 
environmental costs but as well social costs: the airport expansion 
would have changed radically the socio-economic organization of the 
territory, its typical way of life. Besides, they contested Sea‟s lack of 
serious territorial planning, showing how relevant aspects were missing 
in Malpensa‟s expansion plans, especially the territorial integration of 
the airport through appropriate infrastructures of access. The situation 
is that of a typical scenario of order incommensurability in valuing 
costs and benefits, goods and bads, of the expansion.  
The Lombardy Region, at that time a young institution in search of 
legitimacy, with no particular stake in the process of airport expansion, 
assumes the role of arbiter and creates the condition for the elaboration 
of a compromise.11 Starting from 1977, the Region creates a series of 
commissions, both political and technical, in which the problems of the 
expansion are discussed with the broad range of institutional actors 
involved, from Sea to municipalities.  
At the same time, the most important political parties express an 
opinion concerning the expansion as a necessary step towards the 
modernization of infrastructures but that should go with paying 
attention to the environmental impacts. Trade unions as well, at the 
regional level, agree with the idea of a “reasonable” expansion which 
incorporates a compromise between modes of valuation related to 
                                                     
11 Italian Regions were implemented as institutional level of State 
organization in 1970. 
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market and industrial orders and modes of valuation taking into account 
civic, domestic and green modes of valuation of the environment.  
Sea develops a new project of expansion, without a third runway. 
This is the plan called “Malpensa 2000”, targeted on a volume of 
passengers of 12 million (18 million as a maximum). The authority of 
the Ticino Park is very critical of the project for its potential 
environmental impact. The municipalities of the Malpensa area, on the 
contrary, are all aligned on the idea of a reasonable expansion. They 
approve the new plan still expressing concerns for its environmental 
impacts and asking for a study of Environmental Impact Assessment. 
The possibility of the compromise through the idea of “reasonable 
expansion” is based on the construction of a system of monitoring 
devices (of social and environmental impacts of the airport) that is 
crucial in order to test the reasonability of the expansion. However, this 
system of monitoring devices has never been implemented. The 
compromise reached through the idea of reasonable expansion is thus 
not equipped with the appropriated “tests of reality”.   
In June 1986, the Regional Council finally approves the plan for 
“Malpensa 2000” asking for an Environmental Impact Study. Even if 
the Directive 85/337/Cee imposing EIA on certain private and public 
projects has not yet been adopted at the national level, Sea 
commissioned a study of environmental impact that is presented as 
respecting European standards. In fact, once submitted to the analysis 
of the “Group of evaluation of EIA studies” of the Lombardy Region, a 
technical unit created in 1984, the study is shown not to follow 
important methodological guidelines, especially the elaboration of 
alternative scenarios of development, including the “do nothing” 
option. The option of not expanding Malpensa and to develop 
alternative hypothesis (namely a multi-polar system of airports in the 
Milan area) has never been taken seriously into account in the 
discussion concerning Malpensa expansion.  
The document presented by Sea includes a “Green plan” which 
introduces basic forms of environmental compensations. At that time, 
no serious exam in terms of ecosystems and flora and fauna 
compositions is done. Compensations are mainly monetary transfers to 
the Ticino Park authority for financing activities of reforestation. The 
environmental impact is considered mostly in terms of water and soil 
pollution, waste cycle, noise. There is no analysis in terms of 
biodiversity loss or impacts on the landscape.   
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In February 1987 the Ministry of Transport approves “Malpensa 
2000” in the version revised by Lombardy region. In 1988, the Region 
signs with Sea an agreement for the production of further studies on the 
environmental impacts of the expansion. These studies are not realised.  
“Malpensa 2000”: rise and fall of an international hub (1990-2008)  
The works of renewal and expansion of Malpensa begins in 1990. In 
1992 and for two years, works were stopped due to the involvement of 
Sea. in “Tangentopoli”12. The direction of Sea was investigated for 
corruption together with political representatives at the provincial and 
regional levels. The corruption is revealed to have been particularly 
widespread in the procedure of definition of the “Malpensa area plan”, 
an instrument of planning that was supposed to help the reasonable 
integration in the territory of the new activities and infrastructures 
linked to the airport.  
The “Malpensa 2000” project was re-launched in 1994, under the 
first government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (1994-1995), 
through its inclusion in the list of the 14 priority projects selected for 
the creation of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). 
“Malpensa 2000” is presented as a potential “European gateway” - an 
international “hub” 13 - for southern Europe. However, Malpensa was 
far from having the conditions to operate as a hub (a major problem 
was the lack of infrastructures of access). Moreover the plan approved 
for Malpensa 2000 limited the expansion to a volume of traffic of 8-12 
million passengers per year, way below the threshold of passengers of 
an efficient hub.  
The inclusion of Malpensa in the TEN-T was quite controversial. 
The “pro-Malpensa front” includes now clearly the Lombardy Region. 
Far from being the arbiter of the 1970‟s, the Region of the 1990‟s is 
aligned with Sea. For the Lombardy Region, Malpensa 2000 is “not 
only for Lombardy, but for the whole Country, a goal that cannot be 
renounced” (Declaration of the Regional councillor for transport, 
                                                     
12 In February 1992 the discovery of a minor instance of political corruption 
in Milan triggered a broad judiciary investigation which rapidly led to the 
collapse of the political system that had governed Italy for over forty years.  
13 A “hub” is a central airport that flights are routed through. “Spokes” are 
the routes that planes take out of the hub airport, that is why we speak about a 
“hub and spoke” model that at the end of the 1970‟s replaced a “point to 
point” model (direct connections) in the US civil aviation system.  
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1995). The opportunity of expansion of the Malpensa airport is 
presented by the regional and national governments as a higher interest 
which justifies the sacrifice of valuable goods, as the case of 
environmental goods. In this frame, environmental and socio-economic 
compensations are used as an instrument to assure the consensus of the 
local populations. It is at this stage that a clear lexicographic ordering 
of modes of valuation is established by public authorities, stating that 
market and industrial modes of valuation should be considered as more 
important in the public decision than other modes of valuation.    
A final agreement on the inclusion of Malpensa 2000 among the 
priority projects of the TEN-T network is reached in June 1996. It is 
important to notice that the European Parliament in its decision 
1692/96 defines common orientations in the development of the Trans-
European Network of Transportations including the need to consider 
the environmental impacts of these projects. At the European level 
there are visibly contrasting positions concerning infrastructural 
development, with the Parliament supporting the demand for 
environmental sustainability. In the art.8 of the decision it is stated that 
Member States have to take into account environmental preservation in 
the definition and realization of the projects, through EIA procedures 
(according to directives 85/377/CEE and 92/42/CEE on the 
conservation of natural habitats). Considering this article, the proximity 
of the Ticino Park to Malpensa 2000 turns the mega-project vulnerable 
in terms of its responding adequately to criteria of environmental 
sustainability. In fact, as we already noticed, no formal procedure of 
EIA was performed on the airport project expansion.  
Considering this evolution at the European level, in April 1998, with 
the opening of Malpensa 2000 planned in October, the Italian Minister 
of the Environment Edo Ronchi14, writes to the Minister of Transport 
to communicate the necessity to submit the Malpensa 2000 project to a 
EIA procedure, given the important transformations that the project has 
undergone since the environmental impact study realized by S.e.a. in 
1986. Ronchi remarks “a huge increment in the activity of the airport 
and the radical change of its original function”. 
                                                     
14
 Edo Ronchi was with Francesco Rutelli one of the funders of the Italian 
Green Rainbow Party. He was the first “Green” Minister of the Environment 
in the Prodi‟s Government.  
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The necessity of a EIA procedure on Malpensa becomes the main 
argument of the local grassroots mobilization. Notwithstanding this 
controversial situation, Malpensa 2000 becomes operative the 25th of 
October 1998. Due to the sudden increase in the number of flights 
(Malpensa 2000 is now operating with 16-17 million passengers per 
year), the question of the environmental impacts of the airport becomes 
critical.  
The 2nd of July 1999 (with the airport operative since October) Sea 
presents to the Ministry of the Environment, to the Ministry of Cultural 
Activities and Heritage and the Lombardy Region the Study of 
Environmental Impact. No environmental compensations are included 
in the study: a tax on noise and the displacement of the population most 
affected by noise are presented as compensation measures. The study 
lacks any serious analysis of the impact of the airport in terms of flora, 
fauna and ecosystems. Reforestation is evoked as the only 
environmental compensation. No analysis in terms of impact on 
landscape is considered. No elements are given concerning the 
reforestation implemented following the Green plan of the 1980. This 
reveals the lack of a serious follow up of the previous engagements 
assumed by Sea.    
70 observations, all negatives, are presented by local authorities, 
Piedmont and Lombardy Regions, grassroots movements, associations, 
citizens. The 25th of November 1999 the Ministry of the Environment 
states that any additional increment of flights in Malpensa should be 
forbidden. The decision states that in order to minimize the negative 
impact of the airport it is necessary to implement mitigations measures, 
first of all through finding a technical solution to reduce noise on the 
short term and working to a substantial redesign of the uses of the 
airport in the long term.  
In order to find a way out of this situation, the President of the 
Council Massimo D‟Alema emits a decree (DPCM 13 December 1999) 
in which the plans for further increasing Malpensa‟s traffic are 
confirmed, still with a clear engagement in reducing the environmental 
impact of the airport through interventions of mitigation. Among these 
interventions is included the displacement of the population living in 
the area more exposed to noise pollution. Regular programs of 
monitoring are as well included as mid-term interventions. They should 
include epidemiological surveys and studies on the quality of water, 
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quality of air, forest damages. However these programs of monitoring 
(required already in the 1980‟s) are not implemented.  
In the meantime, Malpensa is registering a traffic in 1999 of 17 
million passengers. This same year the Lombardy region approves the 
“Integrated territorial plan of Malpensa” (Regional Law 10/1999) 
which is meant to be an instrument to help the integration of the airport 
in the territory. The plan includes a new “Green plan” which designs 
the realization of a series of green corridors but without any serious 
study of the impacted ecosystems. In particular, the plan frames the 
potential conflicts between the park and the airport in terms of using 
environmental compensation as a way to smooth the tensions. A logic 
of ex-post use of environmental compensations to gain acceptability of 
the expansion of the airport is explicitly stated. Environmental 
compensations are just one of the measures used to try to build a 
consensus on a contested project.  
In order to have an expert opinion concerning the capacity of 
expansion of the Malpensa airport, taking into account the measures 
imposed by the D‟Alema decree, the European Commission asks the 
Cranfield University to develop a study. Apart from remarking that 
some of the measures introduced by the D‟Alema decree are not 
respected, the consultants of the Cranfield University suggests the 
creation of a third runway in order to distribute the impact in terms of 
noise.  
Citizens criticize this study and ask the European Union to take 
seriously into account the environmental problems engendered by the 
airport.  
The Directive 42/2001/CE introduces at the European level the 
procedure known as Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). The 
SEA procedure can detect the cumulative effect of impacts coming 
from interconnected projects, an issue particularly critical in the 
Malpensa case where the way to proceed has always been by single 
project with the lack of coherent planning.  
After the 11th of September 2001 Malpensa suffers a loss of 
passengers as it happens all around the world. Notwithstanding the 
crisis, Sea starts to speak about the second phase of expansion of 
Malpensa 2000 with increasing the capacity of the Cargo City and a 
third runway.  
In 2005 the authority of the Ticino Park voluntarily supported the 
realization of a Strategic Environmental Assessment that analyses the 
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whole territory of the Park, included the airport, and the areas affected 
by the new interventions planned by Sea, showing the lack of a 
coherent territorial planning, the environmental degradation and 
damages to the health of local communities due to pollutants, the 
excessive environmental load on the Ticino Park and the limits of the 
socio-economic benefits. Nevertheless, in the same year, Sea proposes 
to the Lombardy Region to increase the airport capacity to 40/45 
million passengers/per year and to build the third runway.  
The de-hubbing of Alitalia and the new plans for expansion (2008-)  
In 2008 Sea announces in its industrial plans further developments of 
air traffic to be expected for the next years (2013-2014), in connection 
with the event of the Expo 2015 to be held in Milan. Therefore, in the 
short term, interventions are planned to increase the capacity of the 
airport: the construction of a third terminal by 2015 and the third 
runway necessary to improve the overall capacity of the infrastructure. 
The third runway is supposed as well to mitigate the noise impact on 
the territory (ENAC, 2010).  
In  order to justify the expansion, data concerning the evolution of air 
traffic are once more crucial. 
In 2010 Sea master plan with the third runway, developed and 
designed by MITRE – USA, was approved by Enac15 and it is now 
submitted to a procedure of EIA.  
In the meantime, the opposition to the plans of expansion starts to re-
organise. This opposition demands to submit the new Malpensa 
expansion to a procedure of SEA, and not simply to a procedure of 
EIA. The environmental impacts considered are not simply acoustic 
pollution. In fact, airplanes are causing a pollution related to 
hydrocarbons which is suspected to cause damages to environmental 
and human health.  
The study of environmental impact presented by Sea for the EIA is 
now including sections specifically devoted to landscape and 
biodiversity. Nevertheless, these sections had to be complemented with 
additional documentations given the lack of details concerning namely 
environmental compensations. 2.600 negative evaluations of the study 
of environmental impact initially presented by Sea have been sent to 
the Ministry of the Environment during the procedure by various 
                                                     
15 The Italian regulation agency for air transport, which is the responsible for 
airports‟ master plans evaluation. 
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actors, including the authority of the Ticino Park, environmental 
NGOs, local groups, municipalities.  
The way in which the study of environmental impact frames the 
environment is mainly in terms of environmental functions in order to 
define equivalences that allow for compensations. However, these 
compensations are largely left to be defined in the future. What is more, 
areas that were used in the past for compensating the expansion of the 
1990‟s are presented again as possible areas in which to implement the 
new compensations. The large majority of the negative observations 
sent to the Ministry of the Environment by actors opposing the 
expansion points out that previous environmental compensations were 
not or only partially implemented. The long story of lack of 
implementation of environmental compensations and monitoring 
programs has created a lack of trust in the seriousness of compensations 
promised by Sea. The fact that how to compensate for the loss of 
environment is a question largely left by Sea to an envisaged committee 
to be created in the future (in which to involve experts, local and 
regional authorities, environmental NGOs) is a point that the opponents 
to the expansion raise as problematic. How to decide on the expansion 
without knowing if the envisaged compensations are feasible or not? 
In this phase of the conflict, I want to draw attention to the action of 
the grassroots movement “Viva via Gaggio” (Hurrah for Gaggio road), 
initially a small local group of young activists living in Tornavento, the 
most impacted locality in case of construction of a third runway. This 
group –born in 2010- is introducing a new way to speak about and act 
in defence of the environment which is of particular interest to me since 
it is based on modes of valuation of the environment which relies on an 
engagement of familiarity. This group actively tries to produce the 
radical incommensurability of the environment under threat, especially 
the heath land surrounding the Gaggio road.  
The Gaggio road links the small city of Lonate Pozzolo to the hamlet 
of Tornavento and crosses the area that would be absorbed by the 
airport if Sea plan is approved. This road goes through an area which is 
an area of heath land. Heath lands are specific ecosystems quite rare in 
the Mediterranean area. The Heath lands of Lombardy have been 
progressively destroyed. But heath lands are recognised in the Habitat 
Directive (92/43/EEC) as ecosystem to be protected. Nevertheless the 
heath land of Gaggio is not yet recognized as a “Directive Habitat” site. 
In 2011 the authority of the Ticino Park has started the procedure to 
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have this heath land recognised as Natura 2000 site. This decision is 
related to the activity of the grassroots movement that has succeeded in 
producing evidence of the ecological value of the Gaggio heath land.  
The Gaggio road in the 1990‟s was an abandoned path. But a group 
of local volunteers started to recover it. This group recovered as well 
historical remnants from the nineteenth century to the second world 
war, witnessing of the agricultural past of the place and of its history of 
road of frontiers between the Austrian Empire and the Savoy Kingdom 
(until 1861), and its history of occupation by German military forces 
(in 1943-1945). These remnants are catalogued and explained trough a 
series of posters as in a sort of museum in open air.  
After being recovered by local volunteers, the road has been known 
only locally to the population of Lonate until the creation of the 
grassroots movement Viva via Gaggio that turns this road not only into 
a symbol of the fight against the airport expansion but into a real place 
of attachments. In 40 years of struggle against the expansion this is the 
first time that the environment under threat is clearly identified with a 
specific place. This identification of the environmental impact as threat 
to a precise place goes with the use of registers of valuation that rest on 
affection and attachments.  
In fact, the Gaggio road and its environment become in the action of 
the group a person: this road has feelings, identity, a past; the road is 
“one of the family”, “a relative” that we need to protect. The group uses 
expressions like “the death of Gaggio road”, as it was a person. People 
are invited to “come and meet the Gaggio road” and to “stay close as 
much as possible to our relative who is threaten, who‟s going to die”, 
where the relative is the road and its environment.  
This grassroots movement starts from the initiative of Roberto V., a 
30 something from Lonate Pozzolo, working in the municipality, with 
no political engagement in political parties or other movements. When 
the plans of expansion are published, he is surprised by the lack of local 
reactions in Lonate, given that one of the consequences of the 
expansion will be displacements in this town. So he decides that it is 
necessary to wake up people from their “civic coma”, as he says.  
How to wake up people from their apathy? Roberto starts in 2010 to 
record videos that he calls “chat in the Gaggio road”. The idea is to call 
people who are experts of the airport issues, economy issues, and 
environmental issues and to walk with them in the Gaggio road while 
discussing pros and cons of the expansion. He posts these videos on 
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Youtube and on a blog. The group take shapes through the blog and 
starts to exist as grassroots movement (comitato) since February 2010.  
The blog has various sections and it shows the multiple registers of 
critique that the group is able to mobilize. We find data on 
environmental damage, administrative documentations, a petition, that 
is, a “classical” tool of mobilisation. But there is as well a page called  
“scrub” (brushwood) which is about biodiversity and the Gaggio heath 
land. This page has become an autonomous blog in which the 
biodiversity of the Gaggio heath land is explained by a local expert 
through the photos he makes, with his comments that are scientific but 
as well showing feelings of attachment for the place. This initiative has 
then brought to proper scientific studies of the biodiversity of the area: 
various protected species (butterflies and birds) have been detected. 
These studies have been crucial in the decision of the authority of the 
Ticino Park to start the procedure to have the Gaggio heath included as 
a protected Natura 2000 site.  
But the group is not active exclusively on the web. To “wake up” 
people from their “civic coma” Viva via Gaggio organizes strolls and 
promenades in the Gaggio road. The first stroll (organised the 21st 
March 2010, and called “The Spring of Gaggio road) is announced in 
the blog as a “stroll for information and of attachment to the Gaggio 
Road”.  
Through the action of Viva Via Gaggio various people differently 
attached to the Gaggio Road find an opportunity to express and share 
with other this attachment. This happens especially through the 
Facebook page of the group. Using the instrument of tagging photos, 
lovers of the Gaggio road share on the page of the group their 
experience of the Gaggio road: observing remarkable species, sharing 
feelings, contemplating natural beauty.  
The group organizes as well activities to bring new people to know 
the Gaggio road: strolls, sport events (especially bicycle); camping in 
the Gaggio road (“Campogaggio”); art events.  
In their activities, the activists of Viva via Gaggio are relying on a 
mode of engagement of familiarity with the environment in order to 
share with other people a mode of valuation in which this environment 
is valuable first of all because it is a place of personal attachment. 
These modes of valuation turn out to be a powerful resource for 
motivating people in participating in collective activities. These 
activities are first of all leisure activities done in common with others. 
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The group actively promotes the creation (or rediscovering) of 
environmental goods of proximity linked to conviviality: the 
environment is valuable since people are attached to it because of this 
environment being the place of sharing with others common activities 
and a feeling of commonality. People are not supposed to be simply 
users or consumers of the Gaggio road. They are supposed to care for 
the Gaggio road and its environment. Feelings of attachment and care 
are thus the basis on which a proper political mobilisation is built. 
Previous to mobilisation, it is a “place awareness” (coscienza di luogo, 
Magnaghi, 2010) that these activists are trying to arouse. Personal 
attachments are the point of departure for recognizing the radical 
incommensurable value of the environment under threat. But this is not 
enough: activists have to find a way to articulate this radical 
incommensurability with more legitimate registers of valuation in the 
public space. 
It is in particular the category of cultural heritage that is mobilized 
together with the value in terms of biodiversity. Both this modes of 
valuation are compatible with modes of valuation based on 
attachments.  
The activists of Viva via Gaggio promote and sustain forms and 
modes of local attachments to the environment but they work as well to 
articulate modes of valuation based on familiarity with more legitimate 
modes of valuation. In this articulation, a key-figure is that of the 
attached-expert. The attached expert is a person having scientific and 
expert knowledge of the environment (biologists, environmental 
lawyers, local historians) but sharing as well the attachment to the 
place. This attachment is considered as a mode of knowing and 
connecting to the environment and it is considered as co-constitutive of 
the ecological and historical value. The ecological value, in terms of 
biodiversity, exists because of people caring for the environment and 
considering this environment as unique.   
As we can read in the observations written by the institution running 
the Ticino river Park to criticize the study of environmental impact 
presented by Sea, the heath is an ecosystem which can hardly be 
artificially recreated since its origins are in a certain evolution of the 
ways of human use and occupation of the land. This way to understand 
biodiversity is propitious to the inclusion of local attachments to the 
environment as a source of environmental value.  
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The construction of the value of the environment starting from 
attachments implies to impose a limit to the possibility of 
compensation, once the environment is considered as a place and as a 
“dwelled environment”. However, the general modes of valuation most 
propitious to the articulation with a valuation based on attachments (the 
domestic mode of valuation, the inspired one and the green one) are in 
the case of the public decision on Malpensa expansion considered as 
inferior to the market and industrial modes of valuation of the 
environment.   
In fact, the study of environmental impact shows how economic and 
industrial modes of valuation are emphasized by Sea to justify the 
necessity of the expansion. Concerning the environment, potential 
damages are recognised but environmental compensations and 
monitoring of health and environment are considered as a proper way 
to address the future damages. In particular, concerning the ecological 
compensation of the heath land loss, the idea that it would be possible 
to recreate the same ecosystem elsewhere becomes one of the most 
contested issues. 
The struggle is then on the possibility or not to compensate the loss 
of the Gaggio road (as heritage) and of the Gaggio heath (as unique 
ecosystem). Starting from promoting a familiar engagement to the 
Gaggio road (which constitutes its value as incommensurable), Viva 
via Gaggio tries to find ways to fight against the general 
commensurability of environmental loss which is assumed in the study 
of environmental impact document. In this struggle a domestic order of 
worth and a green order of worth are allied in creating the condition to 
translate modes of valuation based on personal attachments into more 
general standards of valuation that impose a limit to equivalence. 
However, the fact that the space of public decision is structured with a 
hierarchical priority accorded to market and industrial modes of 
valuation implies the exclusion of those standards of valuation more 
propitious to the inclusion of valuations based on attachments. In this 
frame, compensations are not used to build a real compromise between 
conflicting orders of worth: they are used to build social acceptability.  
For the moment, notwithstanding the negative advise of the regional 
experts called to evaluate the study presented by Sea, the Lombardy 
regional government has given a positive advise concerning the impact 
assessment saying that, even if environmental damages are probable, 
the strategic role of the airport, at an economic level, largely justifies 
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the decision to approve the plan of expansion. This decision shows 
once more that there is a clear lexicographic ordering of the modes of 
valuation at stake, so that environmental compensations are not meant 
really to compensate for what is loss but to promote the acceptability of 
the environmental sacrifice required in name of a higher interest 
(economic development). Modes of valuing the environment as 
heritage, as landscape, as valuable ecosystem are considered 
lexicographically inferior to the valuation based on industrial and 
market orders of worth. However the legitimacy of this ordering is 
challenged by inhabitants, through a critique which not only brings to 
the fore other relevant goods that should be preserved (including 
environmental goods of proximity) but which raises the doubt on the 
fact that the airport could really enhance economic development. The 
denunciation of private interests (of Sea as real estate company) 
masked as general interest is equally strong in the mobilisation showing 
a general scenario of lack of trust in the airport expansion being 
expression of a general interest. 
7 Final Remarks  
The case of Malpensa is an example of how environmental 
compensations can be instrumental to promoting the acceptability of an 
idea of sustainable development which is based on a clear hierarchy of 
modes of valuation, where market and industrial worth are at the top. 
When this is the case, all those modes of valuation that introduce 
elements of partial or radical incommensurability of an environment  - 
in the sense of the impossibility to establish an equivalence of the 
goods it provides - are considered as not pertinent for public decision, 
and, at best, deemed of attention through compensations. When this is 
the case, compensations are clearly related to a sacrifice which is 
recognized as not fully compensable but that is justified in name of a 
higher general interest. The acceptability of environmental 
compensations is thus related to the consensus surrounding the 
definition of the general interest at stake.  
The case of Malpensa is a good example of technical, scientific and 
institutional difficulties that environmental compensations have to face. 
Who is assuring the control on the correct implementation of the 
compensations? How to evaluate the results in ecological terms? How 
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to estimate the financial investment needed to implement 
compensations? Where to find the areas in which to implement 
compensations? How to solve conflicts related to the necessity to use 
private lands to implement compensations? Is an ecosystem like the 
heath land really reproducible? If taken seriously, environmental 
compensations confront us with the difficult task to define a sound 
institutional and technical frame to assure the production of the 
envisaged environmental goods. If taken seriously, compensations can 
call into question the feasibility of the plans and projects whose impacts 
they are supposed to balance. However, it is important to point out that 
even the most perfect scientific and institutional design of 
environmental compensations can not entirely assure the 
compensability of the lost environmental values once this environment 
is the place of what I have called goods of proximity. Once we consider 
the environment as a place of personal and collective attachments it is 
clear that there are limits to the possibility to find compensations by 
equivalence in that these attachments turn this specific environment 
into a spatial-temporal unique. The social legitimacy and acceptability 
of environmental compensations is thus a problem not simply of 
negotiating conflicting interests. Plural modes of engagement and of 
valuation of the environment are here at stake. How to create the 
conditions for making these plural modes of valuation “compatible” is 
a crucial social and political problem. In this respect, the case of 
Malpensa is showing us what not to do, that is, to impose from the top a 
hierarchy of modes of valuation. 40 years of conflicts are a good 
example enough of the political and social non sustainability of  this 
way to deal with the unavoidable order and radical 
incommensurabilities that public decision on environmental issues 
necessarily raises. 
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